There are only two really good books shops in New Zealand and they’re both in Auckland. One of them is a Borders, and the other one keeps all its theory books in a case marked ‘Brainy Stuff’*. But almost every small town has at least one second-hand bookshop, and all of them, first- and second-hand alike have large sections devoted to New Zealand history and literature, of all of which there’s more than you might think.
In the history sections you’ll generally find a lot of life stories of ordinary people, published by small press and large alike, and a lot of them are war stories, but New Zealanders seem to like reading about other ordinary New Zealanders’ lives, it seems more than they do in Britain. There’s a lot of dross on the shelves, and some very tedious-looking military histories, but there are also some really good popular works on New Zealand history as a whole.
Last year Karen sent me Michael King’s Penguin History of New Zealand as homework, and the first fifty pages of pre-Pakeha Polynesian history are quite extraordinary: New Zealand Maori are the heirs of a people who far exceeded the Vikings’ skill at long sea voyages and navigation a thousand years before Leif Ericson started telling lies about ‘Vineland’. But for my money (a part of which is indirectly owed to Ted Crawford for the recommendation), the best historian of New Zealand is James Belich. And the waiter in the Katipo Café, who grew quite irate at the thought of his as-yet-unconceived children being taught history with Michael King texts, agrees with me, though personally he can’t stand the way Belich writes.
In The New Zealand Wars, Belich excavates in some detail the history of the wars fought between Pakeha settlers and Maori, from Hone Heke’s assault on the flagstaff at Kororareka, through the Waikato wars, to Te Kooti and Titokowaru’s wars, between 1845 and 1872, all of which took place after the signing of New Zealand’s ‘foundation’ document, the Treaty of Waitangi. There’s a bit too much detailed military history in there for me to even begin to remember, but the crux of his argument is that traditional military histories of the land wars are shaped by Victorian racial prejudice to the extent of misrepresenting who won key battles and even wars, and seriously misunderstanding the nature of Maori military tactics. The wars forced fast and furious innovation in traditional Maori pa design, and Maori generals invented both the anti-artillery bunker and trench warfare. In the first case British generals simply failed to understand how ‘primitive’ fortifications could withstand intense artillery bombardment (and consequently set themselves up for a turkey shoot), and in the second case were forced to reinvent the tactic from scratch themselves at the beginning of the twentieth century. His research not only looks at Maori accounts of the war, but reads ‘against the bias’ of settler accounts (of which there were many, mainly castigating the British military for failing to crush Maori forces easily and effectively), on the basis of knowing the framework of the bias.
Making Peoples is a larger history of all of New Zealand, from Polynesian seafarers to the end of the nineteenth century, just before the revival of both Maoritanga and recolonialisation. He divides the book into three sections, the making of the Maori, the interaction between Maori and Pakeha, and the making of Pakeha. The Maori sections are fascinating (at least to someone with a relatively recent acquisition of New Zealand history), not least for their explanation of the development of Maori society between landfall and the first encounter with Pakeha (between Abel Tasman and Ngati Tumatakokiri at Murderers Bay, after which Europeans left Aotearoa alone for over a hundred years: “the most efficient and cost-effective piece of anti-colonial resistance ever”) and the dynamics of resource exploration, game hunting and gardening: a far from static and timeless society.
The Maori section suffers a little from supposition in the face of lack of evidence, but the Pakeha section suffers from surfeit of evidence and a tedious welter of statistics demonstrating class formation and mobility, social cohesion, etc. without creating a sustainably interesting narrative about how Pakeha come to be like what they’re like. It’s a considerable advance on Michael King, though, whose underlying project of defining Pakeha as ‘indigenous’ [contra] makes the fractures that Belich outlines theoretically uncomfortable.
But of course the most fascinating section of the book is the middle section, the story of interaction between Pakeha and Maori. One of the most interesting points he makes, reinforcing points from The New Zealand Wars, is that once Pakeha were discovered, Maori urgently desired their presence to trade with and acquire technology from (rapid conversion to Christianity can be seen as a purely instrumental fast track to literacy). When you read in the Rough Guide that land was sold to the British for ‘beads and a blanket’ amounts, the implication is that Maori were either naïve, or conned by the British. In fact, selling land below its true value was a competitive tactic to attract the advantages of European trade and gain an upper economic hand over neighbouring peoples. The theory of ‘fatal impact’ common at the time, which defined encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples as sadly but inevitably to the fatal detriment of the indigenous still underlies a lot of day-to-day thinking about colonial impact. Maori in general consistently acted intelligently in their own interests; how they came to lose a contest for the governorship of New Zealand is considerably more complicated.
Belich describes how the Old New Zealand, part of tentatively British trans-Tasman world was supplanted by the New New Zealand, created by Britons promoting emigration and settlement in one of the less-attractive parts of the British Empire. He makes Kororareka, ‘the hell-hole of the pacific’ sound a cool place, a kind of South Pacific Croatan where whalers, escaped convicts and native New Zealanders all mixed happily in a rumbustious lawlessness, rather spoiled by the arrival of resident Busby, the pompous ambitions of Empire, boring farmers, and ultimately the Treaty.
Underlying both books is an ultimate explanation that ideology calls into existence facts on the ground. During the New Zealand Wars, he argues, it was not pressure for land from settlers that shaped or even caused hostilities, so much as the need for the British Empire to make real the purely theoretical dominion it had established with the Treaty of Waitangi. Likewise, the ‘crusader prospectus’ encouraged emigration to New Zealand, in order to create either an Arcadia (or ‘better Britain’) or a Utopia (‘greater Britain’), thus shaping settlers’ own ideas of what they were creating in the new country.
I’m not sure whether these are ‘materialist’ histories or not: the material power of ideology can’t be denied, but somewhere I think Belich is missing something about the underlying material dynamics of the genesis of empire. If he didn’t, he might have something very interesting to say about it. I’m not prescribing Lenin or anything, because as Belich points out at the very beginning, the apparently small and irrelevant history of New Zealand is both similar and different to other colonial conquests in a way that illuminates and provokes thought about European-indigenous contact (though there’s a danger of casting Maori in the role of a kind of super-indigenous people and judging other encounters in contrast). It certainly has done for me, and that’s more than good enough.
* New Zealanders are generally possessed of an immense practical intelligence: they know how to build stuff, make stuff and fix stuff. I’m completely useless at things like that, and that’s why I’m always making digs about the country’s unintellectual character.